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who may tell the tale 
of the old man? 
weigh absence in a scale? 
mete want with a span? 
the  sum assess 
of the world's woes? 
nothingness in words enclose? 
Samuel Beckett 
The country of Samuel Beckett's trilogy,  Molloy,  Malone Dies, 
and The Unnamable is a nether-world limbo precariously balanced be- 
tween the world of mind and that of matter.    Across its grounds flit 
the shades of Descartes,   Berkeley,  Hume and a host of less-distinguished 
academic philosophers,   each of them still engrossed in resolving the 
paradoxes of the human situation.    Each thinks that he will find a sat- 
isfactory explanation of the relationship between the mind which thinks 
and the body which acts,  between man's perceptions of   the real world 
and his communication of these perceptions,  and between the specifics 
of experience and their organization into generalities. 
Samuel Beckett rescues these queries from the phraseology of 
a musty philosophical dissertation and translates them into the lang- 
uage of the vaudeville promptbook.    He transforms them from the 
stilted verbiage of the pedant into the patter of the stand-up comedian. 
He parodies the academician's affectation of profundity by treating the 
trivial with the same diligence and devotion with which he approaches 
the important.    He creates a circular world in which all things have 
the same degree of significance and are,  therefore,   equally and end- 
lessly insignificant.    The Trilogy offers the reader a guided tour 
around a circular maze.    This paper will attempt to trace its progress 
from the significant passages to the no less edifying cul de sacs. 
The Beckettian preoccupation is not with the Nativity,  but with 
the nonentity.    His art is not one of creation,  but of destruction or 
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more frequently equivocation of the metaphysical and ontological ques- 
tions which have plagued the artist since the beginning of history. 
The brilliance of Samuel Beckett's Trilogy is that it takes these 
questions and begs,   bends,   and teases them into gag lines,  but poses 
them with such skill that they  elicit not only momentary laughter,  but 
a deeper and more frightening disquiet as well.    They describe the 
tragicomedy that is the human situation. 
Beckett is the virtuoso of the void.    He refuses to admit that 
there is anything to say and makes this denial a subject of significance. 
The Unnamable advises man to "overcome .   .   .  the fatal leaning to- 
wards expressiveness, " while he informs the  reader later that,   "if it 
begins to mean something,  I can't help it. "   But the question of signif- 
icance is exactly the query which Beckett's works do pose.     Where is 
meaning in a world without God?    What is value in a world devoid of 
absolutes,  and what solids can be found in an amorphous substratum 
much like the mud through which the Unnamable crawls. 
Though Beckett does not answer,  he asks these questions with 
unusual precision and clarity.    To appreciate the subtlety of his inter- 
rogation,  one must first become acquainted with the philosophy of 
Rene Descartes,   for Descartes acts as the devil's advocate in Beck- 
ett's cross-examination of the modern world. 
Descartes defines man as a thing which thinks.    "Thought, " he 
states,   "is an attribute which belongs to me; it alone is inseparable 
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from my nature. "      Man is the only animal who is not only conscious, 
but aware of this consciousness.    He is both mind and body.    His body 
exists in space subject to the same physical laws as the machine,   and 
divisible into its component parts as a wheel can be divided into rim, 
sprocket,  and spokes.    The body rots and decays,   as the parts of the 
wheel rust or wear out.    The human mind,   however,   is indivisible or 
unitary.      Unlike the body,   it is not governed by any mechanical laws. 
It is immortal and continues to exist long after the body has succumbed 
to its infirmities. 
Beckett's characters are ideal cartesian homunculi.    They are 
continually losing fingers,  toes,   arms and legs,   but the voice,  the in- 
terlocutor of the mind,   never loses its integrity.    In accordance with 
the Cartesian system,   the voices never cease,  though the bodies which 
they inhabit decay at an amazingly rapid rate. 
A human being,   according to Cartesian reasoning,  has two sep- 
arate,  but collateral histories.    One takes place in the body,  the other 
in the mind.    "The first," states Descartes,   "is public,  the second, 
private."      Since Cartesian rationalism posits no common means of 
1 
Rene Descartes,   Discourse on Method and Meditations (New York, 
Liberal Arts Press,   Inc. ,   I960),   p.   84. 
Gilbert Ryle,   The Concept of Mind (New York,   Barnes &  Noble, 
1949),  p.   11. 
Ibid., p.   11. 
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acquiring knowledge,  this acquisition is a strikingly asocial activity. 
Unlike religion it assumes no communality of understanding through 
universal belief in God or divine guidance.    The human mind,  as 
Descartes depicted it,   was an insulated field in which there was 
". . . no direct causal connection between what happens in one mind 
4 
and what happens in another. 
Modem man has inherited both an awareness of his conscious- 
ness,  and an awareness of the solitude which accompanies it.    Indeed, 
"absolute solitude, " according to Descartes,   "is the ineluctable des- 
tiny of the soul.    Only our bodies can meet. "      The primacy of con- 
sciousness in the Cartesian system is also the privacy of conscious- 
ness.    The human mind does not exist in space.    It does not,  therefore, 
have any identifiable physical properties.    The body can relay sense 
impressions to the mind,  but the human spirit cannot be seen,  heard, 
or touched.    For this reason,  the existence of the human soul in the 
body of another cannot logically be acknowledged. 
The Cartesian system can be depicted as a circle in which the 
mind is the center,   equidistant from all parts of the circle,   but ines- 
capably circumscribed by it.    Descartes had,  however,  an escape 
mechanism from the rationalistic huis clos.    His belief in God or what 
Ibid.,  p.   13. 
Ibid.,  p.   15. 
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he described "a positive idea of the actual,   real,   and infinite" was 
his consolation for the  solitary confinement of the human mind.   The 
concept of God is the only portion of the Cartesian system which man 
can accept without empirical evidence of its existence.    God is an in- 
nate idea in the mind of every man.    It is the only visitant to the other- 
wise isolated residence of the mind,  and without God man faces only 
the negative idea of nothingness or not-being,     as the outcome of the 
logical denial of an external world.    Descartes could escape the sub- 
jectivism which was to plague later thinkers by claiming other ways 
of knowing which do not depend on perceptions of the outer world, but 
are,  rather,  necessary truths imparted by God. 
Beckett is not so readily convinced of the existence of God as 
was his mentor.    The solitude of the human mind without the certi- 
tudes of religion is absolute.    It is surrounded only by the "negative 
idea of nothingness. "    With Beckett,   it becomes more a question of 
ranking irrelevancies than ordering a hierarchy of essentials. 
In the Age of Reason,   it had not yet been doubted that there 
might be neither anything meaningful to say nor a meaningful way to 
say it.    Descartes had,  however,   posited the problem of language by 
making a distinction between man's perceptions and sensations and 
his means of communicating them,  words.    Rationalism in the next 
Descartes,   p.   96. 
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three centuries detached itself more and more from metaphysics to 
become a purely epistemological and dehumanized inquiry. 
Berkeley and Locke also attempted to define the relationship 
between the body and the soul.    The Bishop of Cloyne argued that the 
mind precedes the body,   while Locke believed that the body generates 
the spirit.    Hume extends the problem with a pervasive skepticism 
which denies that man can know anything on the basis of sense percep- 
tion beyond the contents of his own consciousness,  and more import- 
antly, that he cannot use his perceptions as a basis for inferences 
about anything beyond them.    As is seen later in this paper,   Beckett's 
characters freely adapt the mind-matter hypotheses of Berkeley, 
Locke,  and Hume throughout the Trilogy to an infinite number of mod- 
ernistic arrangements.    Although some of them scarcely resemble the 
prototypes from which they come,   the imprint of Cartesian thinking is, 
nonetheless,  apparent. 
With this circumlocution,  we end to begin again with Samuel 
Beckett and Rene Descartes.    Hugh Kenner has observed that Beck- 
ett's fictional trilogy is a work which "carries the Cartesian process 
backwards,  beginning with a bodily je suis and ending with a bare 
cogito. "'    Although the Cartesian myth still asserts its primacy, God 
Hugh Kenner,   Samuel Beckett:    A Critical Study (New York,   Grove 
Press,   1961),   p.   128. 
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has become the joker,   and Reason is no longer the reigning Muse. 
She has been replaced by the  "arsehole, " a deity far more appropri- 
ate to a world in which "what matters ...   is to eat and excrete. 
Dish and pot,   dish and pot,  there are the poles."   In Molloy,  the 
mind is still allied with the body,  but the relationship becomes in- 
creasingly more tenuous as the trilogy progresses. 
The setting for the first novel is ostensibly the Irish country- 
side or what Beckett calls Molloy country.    The landscape is more 
accurately defined as an interior one.    Though the names of the char- 
acters who occupy the central position in this landscape vary,  the 
voice which emanates from these bodies remains the same.    It is 
that of a mind writhing in the agony of an intense consciousness and 
imprisoned by the logical order his language has imposed on an exist- 
ence which is fundamentally both orderless and meaningless.    The 
voice is obsessively compulsive.    It begins its endless soliloquy 
calmly,  becomes more urgent,   and at last is unable to stop itself. 
The persona changes as does the setting,  but the voice is omnipres- 
ent. 
I have my faults but changing my tune is not one of 
them. I have only to go on, as if there was some- 
thing to be done. Something begun, somewhere to 
go.    It all boils down to a question of words. 
The mind encased in the body has infinite freedom according to 
Cartesian logic.    The character or quality of this freedom cannot be 
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described since it is by definition limitless.    But having everything to 
do   and nothing to be done,   is exactly the dilemma that Beckett's char- 
acters confront.    The mind is free to turn inward,  but introspection 
in itself is problematic.     Descartes believed that a perception cannot 
take place without the mind's awareness of the fact that it is perceiv- 
ing.   Accordingly,  the act of thinking requires an awareness on the 
part of the thinker that he is thinking which in turn requires an aware- 
ness of that thought and so on ad infinitum.    The chain that is estab- 
lished is one of infinite regress,  which like the circle has neither be- 
ginning nor end and is ultimately self-defeating.    Infinite regression 
becomes one of Beckett's leitmotivs,   as in the song which Vladimir 
in Waiting for Godot frequently repeats. 
A dog came in the kitchen and stole a crust of bread. 
Then cook up with a ladle and beat him till he was 
dead. 
Then all the dogs came running and dug the dog a tomb 
And wrote upon the tombstone for the eyes of dogs to 
come: 
A dog came in the kitchen,   etc. 
The voice in the Trilogy is that of consciousness chatting with 
both itself and the outer world,   but unable to garner any substantial 
meaning from conversations about a meaningless world.    As Molloy 
observes: 
.   .   .  free yes,   .   .   .  to do what,   to do nothing,  to 
know what,  the laws of the mind perhaps,   of mind, 
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that for example water rises in proportion as it drowns 
you and that you do better,   at least no worse,  to oblit- 
erate texts than to blacken margins,   to fill in the holes 
in words till all is blank and flat and the whole ghastly 
business looks like what it is,   senseless,   speechless, 
issueless misery. 
This peroration early in the first book will become a varia- 
tion on the theme which accretes meaning as it is picked up,   re- 
worded,  alternately denied and then affirmed throughout the novels. 
Speechless misery is that of a voice compelled to speak,   if only to 
reassure itself that it exists,   and conscious of its consciousness, 
but unable to find anything to say or a way to stop saying. 
The Cartesian man had the rationalists' assurance of a natur- 
ally correct and orderly arrangement of the universe.    He believed 
in a natural law which functions in the cosmos and which every man 
can discover if he uses right reason.    Beckettian man is deprived of 
both a religious determinism and a belief in the infallibility of rea- 
son.    Right reason becomes for him a question of point of view,   and 
absolute certainty a fiction. 
Reason driven to its logical extension is solipsism.    Con- 
sciousness bounded by matter cannot prove the existence of other be- 
ings much less of an external world.    Beckettian characters can only 
hope to pass the time by orally twiddling their thumbs.    They do ex- 
ercises in verbal non-communication to prove that they,   at least,   do 
exist. 
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Their choice is that of being silent and uncertain that one does 
exist or speaking though one has nothing to say.    Beckett's voices ulti- 
mately opt for the latter,   for it,   at least,  brings some assurance that 
one is still alive.    The Unnamable finds neither choice,   particularly 
inviting, and spends much of his time  ruminating on it and his insular 
existence. 
Yes,   in my life  .   .   .  there were three things,  the 
inability to speak,  the inability to be silent,  and 
solitude,  that's what I've had to make the best of. 
Beckett's voices are sound without fury.    Rather than rage 
against their sorry state of affairs,  they simply drone on in style and 
rhetoric which emphasize the quotidian and therefore endless nature 
of their sufferings.    The language is not elevated,   because the condi- 
tion which it describes is not an uncommon one.    It is non-dramatic, 
because going on in a meaningless world implicitly denies that there 
are any events or acts which have particular significance.    All is 
equally tedious. 
Beckett's comedians are denied even the solace of a coherent 
tale to tell.    With the exception of a few less than glorious attempts 
on the part of Malone to tell a story,   there is no traditional form to 
the trilogy.    The voices are denied the semblance of order that fic- 
tion imposes on the otherwise random and undifferentiated data of 
sense perception.    Stripped of what are considered to be the minimal 
requirements for storytelling,   plot or characterization,  the voice is 
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often reduced to uttering meaningless tautology,  with nothing but the 
most arbitrary beginnings and conclusions.    This arbitrariness could 
not be otherwise.    Story,   characterization,  and plot imply order,   and 
in effect some degree of meaning in terms of the priorities in selec- 
tivity.    In a world of issueless,   senseless chaos,   coherence would be 
dishonest.    The non-sequitur is the only verity.    Without absolutes, 
it is difficult to find a criterion for selectivity,  thus the sometime 
writer Molloy is given to observing that "saying is inventing, " and 
in writing "you must choose between the things not worth mentioning 
and those even less  so. "    When only relative statements can be made, 
the fictive account is of such an arbitrary nature that Moran,  the de- 
tective in Molloy can write the same paragraph any number of ways. 
None are more valid than any others. 
Then I went back into the house and wrote,  It is 
midnight.    The rain is beating on the windows. 
It was not midnight.    It was not raining. 
In a cosmos of speechless,   solipsistic misery,  the traditional 
fictive furnishings are unnecessary.    The macrocosm of town,   coun- 
try,  and continent is replaced by a small vacant room and thus,   in 
turn,  is replaced by a jar.    The microcosm is so utterly devoid of 
objects that at times Malone cannot decide whether it is a "plenum 
or a void" that he inhabits.    The traditional landmarks of nineteenth- 
century realism have vanished.    Becket eschews the "wealth of filthy 
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circumstance" that Flaubert practiced and all the "ballsaching poppy- 
cock about life and death. "    Rather than rely on a scrupulous attention 
to the minute details of human sense perception,   Beckett prefers to 
create his picture of reality through a form of literary sensory depri- 
vation. 
The existential dasein which normally defines the contingen- 
cies of being in the world with concrete situations and specific objects 
is replaced by ".   .   .   no things but nameless things,  no names but 
thingless names. "   Proper names ultimately become no-names or 
unnamable.    Naming is ordering,  and classification is impossible in 
an orderless world. 
All that remains of stylistic precision in Beckett's works is 
a formal brilliance,   logically precise,   but signifying nothing.    Mol- 
loy expresses his disgust with the inaccessibility of such language to 
any meaning as he observes: 
All I know is what the words know, and that makes 
a handsome little sum, with a beginning, a middle 
and an end as in the well-built phrase and the long 
sonata of the dead. 
Occasionally a chair,   a bicycle,   a window or a piece of clothing will 
make an appearance,  but because things are only a question of ap- 
pearances and may vanish when the eye closes,   they are seldom de- 
scribed and never with enthusiasm of a realistic writer. 
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The Beckett landscape is not the traditional one,   because 
there are admittedly some difficulties in describing a void.   Beckett 
is able to do just this,  however,   in the final novel of the Trilogy,   as 
he depicts Worm's life in a Leyden jar.    Interior space becomes 
opaque as the persona begins to approximate absolute zero.    In the 
following passage,   space is objectified and becomes almost as tangible 
as a wall: 
Space hemmed him in on every side and held him 
in its toils,   the moments streamed away in a great 
chaotic conflux of oozings and the trapped things 
changed and died each according to its solitude. 
The image of the circle is again useful.    The "old foetus" as 
Molloy describes himself,   is fond of observing that his subject of 
discussion is "life from spermatorium to crematorium. "   Womb and 
tomb emprison the body,   as the mind is the prisoner of the body.   Both 
womb and tomb are as circles tangential to life,  but neither are coin- 
cident with it.    Malone's hospital room and Worm's jar are enclosures 
often compared to a vault or a coffin.    All condemn their inhabitants to 
solitary confinement,  on the perimeter between being and non-being. 
Color is another interesting aspect of Beckettian flora and 
fauna.    Contrary to initial expectation,  things are not colorless,  but, 
rather,  they are gray.    This is no world of blacks and whites or of ab- 
solutes,  and equivocation is perhaps best colored gray.    It is a nether- 
world hue more like the  shadow than the substance and indicative of the 
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elusive distinctions Beckett's persona make between life and death, 
consciousness and its absence.    Malone describes his appearance and 
that of his hospital room with a certain degree of affection.    "I myself 
am very gray,  I sometime s have the feeling that I emit gray. " 
The author could choose no better shade for a world without 
significance.    If all things mean nothing,   then judgment is an absurd- 
ity, or rather,   an irrelevance.    Equivocation is the only valid value 
judgment.    After all,  black and white may be either colors or the ab- 
sence of any color.    In world where sense perception can be and is 
often deceptive,   it is better to choose the best of neither shade. 
All that remains to make the description of the Beckett land- 
scape complete is to give its geographic location.    Bounded on one 
side by conscious life and on the other by death,  Beckett's comedians 
are not underground,  but peripheral men.    Like Dostoevski's anti- 
heroes,   Beckett's personae have little regard for society and a 
strained relationship with it,   but unlike their Russian counterparts, 
they have an equally unsatisfactory relationship with their own inter- 
ior world.    Their quarrel is not only with an outer world which im- 
poses meaning where none exists,  but with being itself.    Their suf- 
ferings are the pains of a fetus too far from the womb to get back in, 
and lacking the necessary impetus to be born.    For this reason,   they 
are best located on the periphery of the external world,  but equally 
distant and alienated from the interior world of the mind. 
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The Unnamable describes his habitation quite appropriately: 
.  .  .  Perhaps that's what I feel,  an outside and an 
inside and me in the middle,   perhaps that's what I 
am,  the thing that divides the world in two,  on the 
one side the outside,   on the other the inside .... 
I'm the tympanium on the one hand the mind,   on the 
other the world,  I don't belong to either. 
To a cosmos without common sense,  logically constructed 
nonsense provides diversion in the Pascalian manner.    The permu- 
tations which can be made with the mind-matter relationship are 
numerous.    There is,   for example,  the possibility that one exists 
only in other people's minds.    A thought which is food for Worm,   a 
character in The Unnamable: 
His senses tell him nothing about himself,  nothing 
about the rest .   .   .   .   Feeling nothing,  he exists 
nevertheless,  but not for himself,   for others, others 
conceive him,   as if there could be no being,   but be- 
ing conceived,   if only by the beer. 
Or a second possibility,   equally unrewarding,   is that the mind 
may have died without bothering to inform the body.    This is a logical 
possibility,   if it is remembered that the mind and the body have  sepa- 
rate histories and function independently of each other according to 
Cartesian hypothesis.    Malone in a moment of indecision remarks: 
"My body does not yet make up its mind, " and in a more serious mood: 
I shall not speak of my sufferings,   cowering deep 
down among them I feel nothing.    It is there I die, 
unbeknown to my stupid flesh.    That which is seen, 
that which cries and writhes,  my witless remains. 
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Another alternative in the solipsistic calculus is that things 
exist only when they are discussed.    Here again it is a logical ex- 
trapolation of the skeptic's argument.    The only reality is the men- 
tal one,  and words are assumed to be identical with the mind's con- 
ceptualization rather than the physical experience to which they more 
ordinarily refer.    Such is the situation which the Unnamable imagines 
as he sits,  bodiless,   in his jar,   pure mind,   little matter: 
I felt the cang,   the flies,   the sawdust under my 
stumps,  the tarpaulin on my skull when they were 
mentioned to me.    But can that be called a life 
which vanishes when the subject is changed. 
The arrangements of the mind/matter equation are as numer- 
ous as Molloy's possible placement of sucking-stones in his greatcoat, 
and finally the only feasible solution to his mental gymnastics is the 
same as that of Molloy to his sucking-stone dilemma.   Molloy throws 
all but one stone away and that he later loses.    The Cartesian riddle 
prompts a similar solution by exclusion when the Unnamable can draw 
only conclusions  such as the following: 
I was grievously mistaken in supposing that death 
in itself could be regarded as evidence ...   in 
support of a preliminary life. 
Perhaps the suggestion in this last passage is not only that of 
the frustrations of the Cartesian dualism,  but also the more familiar, 
modern premise,  that life is a waking death as well.    Thinking is dis- 
sociated from feeling,   and therefore being alive as an intellectual experience 
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is different from the emotional and sensual experience in which the 
body participates. The mind is devoid of any useful indicator of its 
own existence without the  sensitivities of the body. 
Under the rubric of "senseless,   speechless and issueless 
misery, " then,   is found mind in matter and life in death.    Chaos is 
further confounded with a third paradox,   stasis in motion,   or what 
in Beckettian parlance may be described as issueless misery. 
The comings and goings in Beckett country are legion.   Molloy 
sets out on a journey to his mother's home,  and Moran to find Molloy. 
In Malone Dies, Sapho leaves home to make his way in the world and 
in the course of his excursion becomes Macmann,  who crawls on 
through life's muck in the way of his predecessors,   Molloy and Moran. 
The Unnamable primarily narrates from his jar,  but both Worm and 
Manhood are given to various forms of circumlocomotion.    Characters 
in the trilogy go around,   by,   and toward one another,  but never up to 
each other.    They begin full-bodied,   upright,  and mobile and conclude 
sans bicycle,   sans torso and sans everything,   but consciousness.    Walk- 
ing,  limping,   creeping,  or crawling they,   nonetheless,   present a pic- 
ture of motion,  of flux and flow,  and implicitly of dynamism.    The fact 
that they usually have a particular goal in mind,   e.g. ,  Moran is look- 
ing for Molloy or the turdy Madonna,   is even more encouraging.    That 
it is purposive movement rather than aimless wandering seems heart- 
ening, at first glance. 
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Malone,  however,   knew better when he observed,   "I have 
pinned my faith to appearances,  believing them to be false. "   The 
continual motion functions as an ironic device to indicate the futil- 
ity of the human condition.    Motion which is derived linguistically 
from the same Latin and French roots as motive normally indicates 
purposive action.    It indicates both a point of departure and one of 
arrival.    Circles,  however,   have neither beginning nor end,   and 
thus the paradox of motiveless motion.     Walking around a circle, 
one can travel forever and never arrive anywhere one has not been 
before.    Beckett's characters not only traverse the same  space, 
they repeat the same phrases and utter the same tautologies,  for 
there is no terminus,  when there is no issue. 
The compulsion to move which the characters indicate is es- 
sential to the condition which Beckett is trying to illuminate.    It is 
like enforced labor on a termless sentence,   and is,   in many ways, 
similar to the penitential waiting which other Beckett characters 
undergo in a godless universe.    This discrepancy between the dy- 
namic quality of movement and its lack of actualization or accomp- 
lishment reinforces the basic futility of the situation.    It is far more 
effective to state the predicament in terms of "having nowhere to go, 
I went, " than assuming limitless possibilities for action which re- 
main unexplored.    When there is no biological excuse for the futility 
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of the mobile persona,   the outlook is,   indeed,   ominous,   for it indi- 
cates that the paralysis is not physical,   but situational.    The perim- 
eter of one's cell is so remote,   that it is obviously nowhere,  but im- 
pinges upon one's freedom everywhere. 
Movement which is no movement has its counterpart in an 
active inertia.    While the characters in Molloy and Malone Dies are 
for the most part victims of movement which goes nowhere,  Malone 
and the Unnamable are preoccupied with dynamic inanition.    Nobody 
comes,  nobody goes,   everything changes,  and remarkably every- 
thing remains the same.    It is as though time has stopped,   but the 
minute hand of the clock continues to circle,   repeating the same se- 
quence of sixty minutes ad infinitum.     This is the active stasis which 
Molloy refers to as the "mythological present."    It has a superficially 
dynamic quality,  because the scene changes,   and the names of the 
characters change,   which ostensibly precludes some chronological 
development through time; but as it becomes clear that the  subject 
will remain the same and the identities of the characters will be in- 
terchangeable,   it is even more apparent that it is a timeless present. 
It has neither precedent or antecedent,   because almost all activities 
are identical and have little,   if any,   causal relationship to one another. 
The Unnamable describes it as "unchanging future into unchangeable 
past, " remarkably uniform and unvarying. 
Here again recognition of the non-dramatic quality of Beckett's 
prose is necessary to an understanding of his use of time.    In a 
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quotidian existence in which all events are equally meaningless,   little, 
if anything,  happens which differentiates one day from the next.   After 
all   as Molloy points out,   "what are crises compared to all that never 
stops, knows neither ebb nor flow. "    The characters do not act,  they 
endure.    This duration is unrelieved by any of the events which could 
invest it with meaning,   and unlike Proust's concept of time has no 
backlog of memories from which to draw.    It has neither richness 
nor depth.    It is quantitive,   not qualitative.    Having no particular pur- 
pose,  it simply passes,   giving a tempo to the tedium,  but little sign 
that it will ever cease.    The characters are not even permitted to die 
of boredom,   consciousness denies them even this diversion. 
The Beckettian time  sequence is identified by its repetitious- 
ness and its lack of variation rather than by the quality of its contents. 
The stultifying nature of the activities in which the characters engage 
is a singularly important aspect of his time concept.    "Memory and 
Habit," Beckett states in his monograph on Proust,   "are attributes 
Q 
of the Time cancer. "      Habitual activities are those which occur and 
reoccur without variation from one performance to the next.    Like the 
rote recitation of a parrot,  they require little thinking and an even 
more minimal amount of feeling.    Not the ordinary,  but the extraordi- 
nary activity excites emotion. 
Samuel Beckett,   Proust (New York,   Grove Press,   1931),   p.   7 
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Habit is the compromise effected between the indi- 
vidual and his environment,  or between the individ- 
ual and his own organic eccentricities ....  Habit 
is the ballast that chains the dog to his vomit. 
Breathing is habit.    Life is habit. ' 
The ennui which is everywhere apparent in the trilogy,   and 
which the comedians with the letter M do not fail to acknowledge with 
the observation "what tedium!" is a necessary and sufficient condi- 
tion of their existence.    It imparts some routine to otherwise form- 
less living,  and numbs the pain of the meaningless misery by decreas^ 
ing awareness and promoting trance-like performance.    Habitual ac- 
tivity renders existence more palatable by decreasing the time one 
must be aware of it. 
The creature of habit turns aside from the object 
that cannot be made to correspond with one or the 
other of his intellectual prejudices,  that resists 
the propositions of his team of syntheses,   organ- 
ised by habit on labor-saving principles. 
In his book on Proust, the author regards suffering as the in- 
correct performance of the tasks of living, while habit and its corol- 
lary, boredom, are signs of the job well done. Daily life, then, be- 
comes the continual struggle between suffering and stupor. 
The pendulum oscillates between these two terms: 
Suffering-that opens a window on the real and is 
the main condition of the artistic experience,  and 
Boredom .   .   .  that must be considered the most 
tolerable because the most durable of human evils. 
10 
11 
Ibid. , pp. 7-8. 
Ibid. , p. 11 
Ibid. , p. 16. 
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This last passage requires a further qualification,   if it is to 
be applied to the works of Beckett,  however.    While with Proustian 
characters it might be  supposed that they are occasionally released 
from the ravages of the time cancer by the power of involuntary mem- 
ory,  Beckettian persona are allowed no such palliative.    They seldom 
eat at all,  and when they do,   it is no confection so rich as a petite 
madelaine.    Their remembrance of things past is identical with their 
activities in the present and their anticipation of the future.    It never 
escapes time or becomes extratemporal,   but is always intratemporal 
or deeply mired in time. 
Again,  their situation is like the old fetus who can neither re- 
turn to the womb nor enter into life.    It is what the Unnamable terms 
prehistory.    This dynamic waiting implies the arrival of someone or 
something which will give meaning to this activity,  and for this rea- 
son,  it is endless potential without,  however,  the possibility of ac- 
tualization.    Preface without beginning,   active inanition is a major 
source of irony in the trilogy.    Noone has described its function more 
effectively than the Unnamable: 
Is not a uniform suffering preferable to one which 
by its ups and downs is liable in certain moments 
to encourage the view that perhaps after all it is 
not eternal. 
Time seems to pass,   but it is only a literary illusion.    Malone 
tells himself stories,  takes  stock of his possessions,  and makes notes 
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in his diary.    All of which give the appearance of passing the time. 
But such business is deceptive.    The central situation,   the human 
condition,   retains its devastating sameness.    It is rather as Malone 
observes,   "the forms are many in which the unchanging seeks relief 
from its formlessness. "   One may choose to pass the time in var- 
ious ways,   but merely rearranging the sequence neither diminishes 
nor increases its significance. 
The concept of the mythological present has some interest- 
ing corollaries.    Beckett's space-time is the present,   and as such, 
is is one-dimensional.    Meaning and depth are a function of the ac- 
cretion of previous experiences and past associations which make 
present experiences significant.    If,  however,   as Molloy says, 
"some of my memories have their roots deep in the immediate past, " 
it is doubtful that many associations would be stored there.     Without 
memory or history to impute meaning to new situations through their 
relationship to previous experiences,   all remains on a single- 
dimensional level.    The surface of existence is flat,   opaque and super- 
ficial without some  reference to the past. 
The memoryless status of Beckett's unfortunates is a remin- 
der of Dante's reference in the Divine Comedy to the  river Lethe,   for 
like Dante's disembodied souls the Beckett personae are oblivious to 
the past,  but unlike the inhabitants of Purgatory,   their destination is 
not paradise,   but an inferno of infinite sameness. 
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A second corollary of a time-sequence which is without mem- 
ory or history is that it makes language almost an impossibility.    The 
sentence which is temporal and takes place in time depends upon the 
retention of what is said at the beginning for comprehension of the end. 
Words assume meaning through their relationship to other words or 
their relation through time,  and such contextual meaning is impossible 
without memory. 
Time,   or the mythological present,   not only reinforces the 
feeling of futility and obstructs communication,  it aids in the isola- 
tion of the mind in the body.    The sensory deprivation from which the 
personae,  particularly the Unnamable,   are suffering is that in which 
the thought is separated or alienated from the act.    It is as though 
the synapse between the brain and the nerve ending had been extended 
indefinitely.    It is not simply a pause,   but a complete cessation.    The 
mind-body lesion is illustrated by such statements as Molloy's objec- 
tive commentary on his own infirmities: 
And at first I did actually seem to feel a little bet- 
ter,  but little by little I acquired the conviction that 
such was not the case, 
and the Unnamable's annoyance at the "infinitesimal lag between the 
arrival and departure of (words)".    A more serious statement of this 
same problem in terms of language is the Unnamable's frustrated 
query: 
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.  .  .  how can you think and speak at the same time, 
without a special gift,   your thoughts wander,   your 
words too,  far apart •   .   .  between them would be 
the place to be,   where you suffer,   rejoice,  at being 
bereft of speech,  bereft of thought,   and feel nothing, 
hear nothing,  know nothing,   say nothing,   are noth- 
ing. 
This last passage reflects the schism not only between the mind 
and the body,  but the equally serious and more modern separation of 
the spoken word from both speaker and listener or the written word 
from both writer and reader.    It foretells a return to the cul de sac 
to which the deification of Logos unfailingly leads. 
Language is built upon words which are commonly assumed to 
have a referent in the real world of experience.    Communication is 
likewise based upon the assumption that there are certain experiences 
common to all people which can be referred to by means of arbitrary 
signs or words.    Each mind,  however,   and hence each person's ex- 
perience of the world is wrapped in the "ineluctable solitude of the 
soul" as Descartes has stated and is,   in no way,   identical to the ex- 
perience of any other individual.    Communication through language 
is, therefore,   impossible.    When the solipsistic circle is correctly 
drawn,  it leaves no room for any voices other than one's own. 
In a world such as Beckett has created,   language as communi- 
cation is a futile gesture.    It is the vestigial remains of Cartesian 
rationalism.    By definition solipsism is the theory that the self can 
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know nothing but its own modifications.    The language of the self is 
intelligible only to the self.    It is private and opaque,  having neither 
analogical or metaphorical possibilities.    Nothing can be like any- 
thing else,   it can only be itself.    The lover may be like a red rose, 
but only to Robert Burns.    The modern sensibility is more inclined 
to agree with Gertrude Stein's definition of this flower. 
Language in the solipsistic system has no mediating purpose, 
for it does not serve to express the experience of the speaker to 
listener.    It is,  however,   not completely dysfunctional.    Molloy finds 
that it gives him some aesthetic pleasure: 
...  I had quite a sensitive ear,   and sounds unen- 
cumbered with precise meaning were registered 
perhaps better by me than most. 
In fact,   sounds unencumbered with meaning become the only 
catechism one can recite in a world without absolutes.    For this rea- 
son,  Beckett makes several references to the speech of parrots both 
in the trilogy and in other works.    The parrot captures the sound, 
but not the sense of human speech.    He is therefore an ideal mimic 
for the phrase Malone's friend,   Jackson,  attempts to teach him.    The 
parrot is taught to repeat "nihil in intellectu, " but has never learned 
the remainder of the phrase.    It is probable,  however,  that if he 
could learn it,  the quotation would be  similar to the observation of 
the Belgian Occasionalist Geulincx,  whom Beckett admired:  "ubi 
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nihil vales,   ibi nihil velis,   where you are worth nothing,  there you 
should want nothing. " 
To speak like the parrot is to gain momentary asylum from 
the sufferings of the  present,   for thoughtless speech allays the fear 
of solitude by producing sound,  but does not force one to be aware 
of the vacuity of the words one utters.    The Unnamable was certainly 
aware of this fact when he said,   "If I could learn something by heart, 
I'd be saved.    I have to keep saying the same thing,  and each time 
it's an effort. " 
Beckett voices this breakdown in linguistic confidence most 
pessimistically in his monograph on Proust: 
There is no communication because there are no 
vehicles of communication.    Even on rare occa- 
sions when words and gestures happen to be valid 
expressions of personality,  they lose their signifi- 
cance on their passage through the cataract of the 
personality that is opposed to them.    Either we 
speak and act for ourselves  - in which case speech 
and action are distorted and emptied of their mean- 
ing by an intelligence that is not ours,  or else we 
speak and act for others  - in which we speak and 
act a lie. 13 
Descartes,   it must be remembered,   distinguishes man from 
other primates by virtue of his ability to speak.    When this is no 
12 Ruby Cohn,   "Philosophical Fragments in the Works of Samuel 
Beckett," in Samuel Beckett,   ed.  by Martin Esslin (Englewood 
Cliffs,  N.  J.,  Prentice-Hall,   1965),   p.   170. 
13 
Beckett,  Proust,   p.  47. 
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longer possible or rather when verbal communication becomes sus- 
pect, the foundation of modern western tradition is threatened.    Mod- 
ern man has become compartmentalized man.    He belongs in the jars, 
closet-like rooms,  and crevices to which Beckett has relegated him. 
The Cartesian dualism has reproduced itself several times over,   and 
its offsprings are equally as frightening as the progenitor.    Mind and 
matter, thought and act,   intellect and feeling,   and substance and 
symbol are some of the ways into which the progeny may be divided. 
The original sin,  however,   is that of divorcing rationality from per- 
ception and sensation.    The confident unity of the Enlightened mind 
becomes the shrapnel of the twentieth-century self and makes inte- 
gral functioning impossible. 
The Cartesian thinking man has become no man,  but only a 
fragment of the whole.    The Unnamable's voices in the concluding 
sections of the Trilogy are the garrulous pieces of self trying fran- 
tically to talk themselves into a whole.    The ominous "they" to 
which the Unnamable is constantly alluding are all facets of his own 
personality which a well-meaning rationalist has set free to wander 
aimlessly through the labyrinthes of the mind. 
If coherence in the outer world is reliant on the systemati- 
zation and classification of experiences in a commonly accepted or- 
der,   coherence in the inner world requires the union of intellect, 
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will, and emotion.    If things fall apart,   if they become discrete phe- 
nomena without relation,  then the center does not hold.    Beckett does 
more than simply re-echo Yeat's theme,  he subjectifies and human- 
izes it,  and leaves the reader with no illusions about a second com- 
ing. 
The Cartesian dualism posits the separation of thought from 
act and the Unnamable's voices graphically describe a logician's 
nightmare.    The Freudian abnormal becomes in the Beckett cosmos 
the modern everyman,   the prosaic voices of a self so definitively 
splintered that they are no longer even aware of their lesions.    The 
voices are the thought preforming the unending pensum of acknowl- 
edging that the personae is alive,  the infinite regression that the Un- 
namable observes Worm performing.    "Perhaps," muses the Un- 
namable,   "he won't be able to bear any more,   of not being able to 
bear any more,  of not being able to bear any more. " 
Consciousness goes on showing no way out,   and dualism 
goes on showing no way in.    Silence,  then,   becomes the ultimate 
goal.    As all else in Beckett's work,   its possible explanations are 
numerous.    It can mean cessation of consciousness and death, 
which is the only escape from an absurd universe.    It may mean 
the unification of the self,  which would allow the voices to stop 
speaking at cross-purposes to one another.    Silence is perhaps 
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neither of these things but rather the complete separation of the mind 
from the body.    This would allow it to escape from the mechanics of 
existence into a Nirvana of Nothingness.    The solution to the problem 
is unclear not only because there is no simple or even ample answer, 
but also because the main purpose of the Trilogy is to illuminate the 
human condition,  not to rectify it. 
It would be comforting to be able to say that the Trilogy con- 
cludes on even a modestly affirmative note.    It does not,  however, 
conclude at all.    It simply terminates.    It could continue ad infinitum, 
the same things happening not twice as has been said of Waiting for 
Godot,  but an infinite number of times. 
The Unnamable ends with an agony of words the way Molloy 
began.    Its exodus is reminiscent of strangely mangled genesis,   a 
mocking reminder of a sacred world in which religion imposed order 
and provided the substratum upon which act and the meaning of the 
act could be based.    In the End is the Word,  and the Word is with 
Naught and the Word is Naught. 
The circle ends where it began,  with words.    It is not,  how- 
ever,  only one circle,  but a series of concentric circles.    Beckett's 
enigmas are modeled after the Chinese puzzle,  a nest of boxes each 
one smaller and more perplexing than the one that encloses it,   not 
only macrocosmic,   but microcosmic chaos.    Man alienated not only 
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from his environment,   but from other men,  and most important 
from himself.    Like the subdivisions of a fraction which come 
closer and closer to approximating zero,   but always failing to 
reach it,  each division the comedians posit leading to another 
equally insoluble.    All of humanity separated from divinity or 
divine Logos,   individual men separated from one another by the 
diversity of their experiences,   and the inner splintering of person- 
ality, which separates man from himself. 
Beckett's vision may be tragic,   but,   if so,  it is the suffer- 
ing of a Chaplin rather than an Oedipus.    The Aristotelian purpose, 
passion,  and perception are all present,   but they do not follow one 
another,  at least not any formation Greek decorum would allow. 
There is no causal relationship between the act and the passion, 
which climaxes in the perception.    The Beckettian comedians are 
all too aware of their situation and their sufferings; however,  they 
do not learn from them.    There is no Aristotelian perception,  be- 
cause there is nothing to be learned from experience.    Absurdity 
is not especially edifying.    Beckett's conception of tragedy is best 
stated in the following passage from Proust: 
Tragedy is not concerned with human justice.    Tra- 
gedy is the statement of an expiation,  but not the 
misera-expiation of a codified breach of a local ar- 
rangement ....   The tragic figure represents the 
expiation of original sin .   .   .  the sin if being born. 
14 
Ibid.,   p. 49. 
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It is difficult to assess a work which seeks to describe the 
expiation for the  sin of being born.    For a man who practices the 
art of the cipher,  his works are amazingly well-supplied with am- 
biguities and complexities of meaning.     The magnitude of Samuel 
Beckett's genius becomes quite clear,  when the simplicity and fa- 
cility of his language is compared to the profundity and the com- 
plexity of his vision.    Objection of spiritual emptiness and human 
solitude and characterization of an extraneous man both require 
an extraordinary talent.     The author must make the ordinary in- 
teresting.    In a series of dialogues with artist-critic Georges 
Duthuit published in Transition in  1949,   Beckett discusses modern 
painting and the purposes of artistic creation.    He states that he is 
searching for an art which turns from traditional forms of expres- 
sion to: 
The expression that there is nothing to express, 
nothing with which to express,   nothing from which 
to express,   no power to express, together with 
the obligation to express. 
He describes this new aesthetic further as an art ".   .   .   unresentful 
of its insuperable indigence and too proud for the farce of giving and 
receiving. "   6   If one accepts the author's own criterion for art,  he 
fails brilliantly.    Beckett's self-imposed pensum is like that of his 
15 
Ibid. ,  p.   17. 
16 Ibid.,  p.   18. 
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characterswho act,   unable to act,  and obliged to act.    Beckett the 
artist creates where no creation seems possible.    He chooses the 
plotless story,  the tale not worth telling and tells it with such an 
astounding virtuousity that the reader is not even disappointed at 
being denied an ending,  much less a happy one.    His comedians 
commit every error of which the second-rate novelist is guilty. 
They are verbose,   repetitious,   and incapable of following any 
narration to a coherent conclusion.    They are almost tedious.   It 
is Beckett's skill only which prevents them from being so.    He 
succeeds because he gives the reader a dual vision.    He describes 
men who want to be machines,  who describe walking or crawling 
as if it were a matter of levers and cogs.    He depicts humans who 
yearn to be sines and co-sines,  who speak in syllogisms and revel 
in making algebraic computations out of the most prosaic sums, 
but whose bodies break down and reveal their frailty and whose per- 
petual matter-of-factness,  frequently is betrayed by a slightly fren- 
zied shrillness,  the anguish of the trapped and solitary mind. 
Beckett's clowns succeed because the author describes both 
the antic comedian and the man behind the make-up.    His charac- 
ters never prophesy.    There is no wailing about alienation and no 
dreary peroration on the sociological factors responsible for their 
wretched state of affairs.    The comedians make jests of their 
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jeremiads,  and so they gain the heart,   while they entertain the 
head. 
Molloy,  Malone Dies,  and The Unnamable are outstanding 
works of contemporary literature,  because they do the impossible. 
They take nothing and make it humorous,  terrifying,  and even edi- 
fying.    In his book on Proust,  Beckett describes art as the "apotheo- 
sis of Solitude. " According to this definition,  the Trilogy is art 
of the highest form,  but the universality of such a definition for art 
must be questioned.    While the solipsistic circle is art in the works 
of a man of Beckett's genius,   it is not certain that the art of the cul 
de sac has ultimately a particularly interesting or useful role in lit- 
erature.    It is,  indeed,  a dead end,  a literary hari-kari for less- 
talented writers; for while it destroys sometimes obsolescent fic- 
tional traditions,   it does not normally replace them with any more 
creative concepts.    It poses valid questions and sometimes quite 
successfully depicts modern problems,  but it must be asked if this 
alone is sufficient.    If language is to be denied the function of com- 
munication,  then its sole purpose becomes that of self-expression. 
This is,  perhaps,   permissible for the man of genius,  but otherwise 
it leads only to a cult of egoism with most subjectivists not really 
17 Ibid., p.   19. 
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having any sentiments better left unpublished in his private diary. 
It is not ultimately possible to make an art of failure that lasts, be- 
cause literature needs not only negative assertions to free it from 
unnecessary restraints,   but positive expressions which can utilize 
this freedom in ways other than bewailing the fate of man.    There 
can be no such thing as value-free literature without eventually de- 
generating into the mauve decadence like that of the  1890's;  neither 
can there be a continuing fidelity to nihilism which does not eventu- 
ally become narcissistic self-immolation. 
The works of Samuel Beckett show a brilliant artistry and 
freedom from restraint.    They show the creative potential of the 
novel both as comedy and as tragedy in ways in which it has never 
before been demonstrated.    They replace the bourgeois novel with 
vaudeville.    Beckett's comedians depict for the reader the pathos and 
the comedy of a negative humanism with all the dexterity of the 
sleight-of-hand man.    Samuel Beckett has expanded the circumfer- 
ence of the circle,  and has made open spaces of an enclosed place. 
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